ABSTRACT. The notion of ciphertext undetectability was introduced in [Gaži, P. -Stanek, M.: On ciphertext undetectability, Tatra Mt. Math. Publ. 41 (2008), 133-151] as a steganographic property of an encryption scheme. While finding the relationship between ciphertext undetectability and indistinguishability of encryptions, authors showed that ciphertext undetectability does not imply indistinguishability. Though the proposition is correct, the proof is not. In this note, we provide a correct proof of the above-mentioned result by a slight modification of the construction used in original paper cited above.
Introduction
In [1] , authors introduced the novel notion of ciphertext undetectability (CUD) as a steganographic property of a public-key encryption scheme (PKE). Informally, an encryption scheme has the property of ciphertext undetectability, if the attacker is unable to distinguish between valid and invalid ciphertexts. Moreover, the inter-relationships between ciphertext undetectability and other existing well-studied security notions are discussed in [1] .
In Theorem 4.2 of Section 4.1 [1] , authors showed that there exists PKEs which are CUD-secure but not IND-CPA secure. However, we point out a flaw in the proof and propose a modified construction to prove the same result. For notations and preliminaries, see [1] .
Definition of ciphertext undetectability
Let S = (G, E, D) be a public key encryption with ciphertext space C. Also, let us denote by C v , the set of all valid ciphertexts, i.e., C v = c ∈ C : D(c) =⊥ . Formally, an adversary A, running in two phases ask and guess, for attacking ciphertext undetectability behaves as follows.
ANGSUMAN DAS -AVISHEK ADHIKARI
In the first stage of the adversary's attack, A takes a public key pk, and outputs some state information s. The challenger chooses b ∈ {0, 1} randomly.
In the guess phase, A guesses b for the hidden bit b.
• Set up: The challenger picks (pk, sk) ← G(1 k ) and gives pk to A.
• Query Phase I: A is given access to the oracle D 1 (·).
• Challenge Phase: The challenger flips a random coin b ← {0, 1} and receives some state information s from A. If b = 0, challenger chooses c * ∈ C v randomly, else choose c * ∈ R C \ C v , and gives c * and s to A.
• Query Phase II: A is given access to the oracle D 2 (·).
• Output Phase: A outputs a bit b . The advantage of A in this game is given by Adv
Finally, an encryption scheme S = (G, E, D) is said to be CUD −atk secure, atk ∈ {CPA,CCA1,CCA2} if
2. there exists a deterministic polynomial algorithm, which accepts exactly the set C,
(k) is negligible, where A ranges through all polynomial time probabilistic adversaries.
Construction used in Theorem 4.2 of [1]
Let atk ∈ {CPA,CCA1,CCA2} be an attack model. Let S = (G, E, D) be a CUD-atk secure scheme with plaintext space P. Consider the scheme S = (G , E , D): In the proof of the Theorem 4.2 in [1] , authors claimed that S is also CUD −atk secure as the sets of valid ciphertexts of S and S are same. However, that is not true. Consider the set of all possible ciphertexts of m + in S, apart from c + . This subset consists of valid ciphertexts if considered w.r.t S, however they are invalid if considered w.r.t S . The reason is that only c + can be the valid ciphertext corresponding to m + in S . This creates the difference in the set of valid ciphertexts of S and S . We fix this flaw by suitably modifying their construction in the following section. G , E , D) , where G , E are modified as in Fig. 2 and D is kept unaltered. Clearly, the above construction in Fig. 2 is not IND-CPA secure as the encryption of a publicly known message m + is almost deterministic, i.e, it returns c + with an overwhelming probability of 1 − 1 2 k . On the other hand, the construction also ensures that the set of valid ciphertexts are same for both S and S . By a simple reduction it can be shown that S is CUD-atk secure if S is so.
